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ABSTRACT 
The collapse of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in Fall 
1998 and the Federal Reserve Bank’s subsequent efforts to orches-
trate a bail-out raise important questions about the structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The Code contains numerous provisions affording 
special treatment to financial derivatives contracts, the most impor-
tant of which exempts these contracts from the “automatic stay” and 
permits counterparties to terminate derivatives contracts with a 
debtor in bankruptcy and seize underlying collateral. No other coun-
terparty or creditor of the debtor has such freedom; to the contrary, 
the automatic stay prohibits them from undertaking any act that 
threatens the debtor’s assets. It is commonly believed that the exemp-
tion for derivatives contracts helps reduce “systemic risk” in financial 
markets, that is, the risk that multiple major financial market partici-
pants will fail at the same time and, as a result, drastically reduce 
market liquidity. Indeed, Congress is now contemplating reforms that 
would extend the exemption to include a broader array of financial 
contracts, all in the name of reducing systemic risk. This is a mistake. 
The Bankruptcy Code can do little to reduce systemic risk and may in 
fact exacerbate it, as the experience of LTCM suggests. Risk of a sys-
temic meltdown arose there and prompted intervention by the Fed 
precisely because derivatives contracts were exempt from the auto-
matic stay. Derivatives contracts may merit special treatment, but fear 
of systemic risk is a red herring. 
A better, efficiency-based reason for treating derivatives con-
tracts differently arises naturally from the economic theory underly-
ing the automatic stay. The stay protects assets to the extent they are 
needed to preserve a firm’s going-concern surplus (its value above 
and beyond the sale value of its assets). Assets are needed to preserve 
going-concern surplus only if they are firm-specific, that is, only if 
they are worth more inside the firm than outside it. This is often true 
for plant and equipment. It is never true for derivatives contracts. 
This observation helps rationalize the Code’s treatment of derivatives 
contracts and other features of the automatic stay. There are, how-
ever, downsides to treating derivatives contracts differently (credi-
tors, for example, would like to disguise loans as derivatives con-
tracts). These downsides are probably not significant, but they high-
light the fragility of the Code’s treatment of derivatives contracts, 
which should worry members of Congress as they consider argu-
ments to expand the Code’s exemptions for derivatives contracts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In Fall 1998 the Federal Reserve Bank (“Fed”) arranged a bail-
out of the massive hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), which faced the prospect of immediate liquidation if it filed 
a petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Although the 
Code generally prevents creditors from seizing assets of a firm in 
bankruptcy (also called the “automatic stay”), counterparties to de-
rivative contracts (options, swaps, repos, and the like) receive special 
treatment under the Code and are free to terminate contracts and 
seize collateral to the extent they are owed money. Defending the 
Fed’s decision to assist LTCM, Alan Greenspan explained:  
[T]he act of unwinding LTCM’s portfolio in a forced liquidation 
[precipitated by LTCM's derivatives counterparties] would not 
only have a significant distorting impact on market prices but 
also in the process could produce large losses, or worse, for a 
number of creditors and counterparties, and for other markets 
participants who were not directly involved with LTCM ... . Had 
the failure of LTCM triggered the seizing up of markets, sub-
stantial damage could have been inflicted on many market par-
ticipants ... and could have potentially impaired the economies 
of many nations, including our own.”1 
The Fed believed that its intervention was necessary to avoid a sys-
temic meltdown that might arise from LTCM’s liquidation—a liqui-
dation made possible by the Bankruptcy Code’s special treatment of 
derivative contracts.2 
The irony here is that the Bankruptcy Code’s special treatment 
of derivatives stems from a desire to avoid systemic risk. Thanks to 
an exemption from the Code’s automatic stay–which bars all other 
creditors from terminating contracts with or seizing assets from a 
firm in bankruptcy–counterparties to derivatives contracts are free to 
terminate the contracts and then seize collateral to the extent that they 
are owed money. As reported in legislative history, Congress believed 
this exemption from the automatic stay was necessary to prevent the 
“insolvency of one commodity or security firm [from] spreading to 
                                                                                                                 
1 Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry, 105th Cong. 5 (1998) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
2 On this point, see, e.g., Michael Krimminger, Insolvency in the Financial 
Markets: Banks, Hedge Funds, and Other Complications, 18 Banking Policy Re-
port (Jan. 18, 1999). 
4other firms and possibly threatening the collapse of the affected mar-
ket.”3 In other words, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to 
prevent a systemic collapse that might arise if a derivatives counter-
party were unable to liquidate its contracts with a bankrupt debtor 
immediately. But, as the LTCM experience demonstrates, permitting 
the immediate liquidation of a large financial institution counterparty 
such as LTCM can generate another form of systemic risk, namely 
the risk that a “run” by derivatives counterparties on the debtor will 
itself destabilize financial markets. 
The Fed's intervention to aid LTCM, therefore, calls into ques-
tion the policy rationale underlying the Bankruptcy Code’s special 
treatment of derivatives. In this paper, we make the following claim: 
derivatives may deserve special treatment, but not for the reason 
commonly given. When systemic risk is a legitimate concern, the 
Code can do little to mitigate it, and may even make matters worse, 
especially in cases in which large financial institutions (such as 
LTCM) are involved. But if systemic risk is a red herring, is there any 
justification for treating derivatives contracts differently under the 
Bankruptcy Code? We think there is: that derivatives (and the associ-
ated cash collateral) are not firm-specific assets and therefore giving 
them special treatment will increase economic efficiency. This obser-
vation rationalizes many features of the Code’s automatic stay, which 
offers most protection to potentially firm-specific assets (such as 
plant and equipment), less protection to assets (such as cash collat-
eral) that are fungible but may be hard to replace without substantial 
investments in relationships with new lenders, and least protection to 
fungible assets (such as derivatives contracts) that can be replaced 
easily. 
Section 1 describes the Code’s special treatment of derivatives 
contracts and the common justification given for it. In Section 2, we 
challenge this conventional wisdom, arguing that the Code is a poor 
tool for reducing systemic risk. Indeed, as the case of LTCM illus-
trates, the Code may in fact exacerbate this risk. Section 3 asks 
whether there are alternative (efficiency-based) justifications for the 
special treatment given to derivatives contracts under the Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
3 H.R. Rep. No. 97-420, at 3 (1982). See also 128 Cong. Rec. 15,981 (daily ed. 
July 13, 1982) (comments of Sen. Dole) (“It is essential that stockbrokers and secu-
rities clearing agencies be protected from the issuance of a court or administrative 
agency order which would stay the prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s positions, 
because market fluctuations in the securities markets create an inordinate risk that 
the insolvency of one party could trigger a chain reaction of insolvencies of the 
others who carry accounts for that party and undermine the integrity of those mar-
kets.”). 
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Code. Derivatives contracts are different, we argue, because they are 
fungible assets and can be seized by creditors without endangering a 
firm’s going-concern value. Derivatives contracts are not unique, ob-
viously; other assets of a firm, such as cash, are nearly as (but not 
equally) fungible. We show that the Code rationally distinguishes be-
tween assets with more or less specificity, offering greater protection 
to high-specificity assets and less protection to low-specificity assets. 
Section 4 looks closely at the ex ante costs of a rule that treats deriva-
tives contracts differently. We focus particularly on the rent-seeking 
opportunities created by such a rule. The benefits arguably outweigh 
the costs, but only if the rule either reduces systemic risk (which we 
doubt) or singles out fungible assets that creditors can seize without 
endangering a firm’s going-concern value (which we think is the 
case). If neither condition holds true, there is no principled reason for 
offering special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code to derivatives 
contracts. Section 5 concludes. 
I. DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
When a firm files a bankruptcy petition, it immediately enjoys 
the benefit of the Bankruptcy Code’s “automatic stay,” which forbids 
any creditor from taking steps to collect debts, seize assets, or other-
wise “exercise control over property” of the debtor firm.4 The auto-
matic stay is a core element of any attempt to reorganize under the 
Code. By shielding the debtor’s assets and preventing a race that re-
wards the first creditor to the courthouse, it avoids dismemberment of 
a firm with going-concern value and facilitates a collective proceed-
ing in which the parties (debtor and creditors) can negotiate the terms 
under which the firm will continue as a going concern. 
There are, however, many exceptions to the automatic stay. 
Some are intuitive. The stay, for example, does not extend to the gov-
ernment’s police or regulatory power; a debtor cannot avoid criminal 
prosecution or the enforcement of environmental protection laws 
(unless, of course, the government is simply using its regulatory 
powers to collect debts).5 Along the same lines, a bankrupt educa-
tional institution cannot use the stay to prevent accrediting agencies, 
state licensing bodies, or the Secretary of Education from a reevalu-
ation of the institution’s quality and eligibility for funding.6 Here we 
                                                                                                                 
4 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
5 § 362(b)(1), (4). 
6 § 362(b)(14), (15), (16). 
6see a Congressional judgment that the benefits of government regula-
tion outweigh the costs to the debtor. 
Other exceptions are less intuitive, especially those involving de-
rivatives contracts, such as futures, forwards, repos, and swaps. 
When a firm enters bankruptcy, a counterparty typically7 may cancel 
and net various contracts (in-the-money contracts are netted against 
out-of-the money contracts) and then seize collateral to the extent 
that the troubled firm is a net obligor to the counterparty.8 The special 
treatment of derivatives contracts is not new. When the Bankruptcy 
Code was enacted in 1978, it contained an exemption from the auto-
matic stay for non-debtor brokers and forward merchants with re-
spect to transactions involving margin payments or deposits received 
from a debtor under a commodities contract or a forward contract.9 
Amendments to the Code in 1982, 1984, and 1990 expanded the ex-
emption to include an array of financial transactions known as “de-
rivatives securities” contracts, including forward contracts, commod-
ity contracts, repos, and swaps. Counterparties to a derivatives securi-
ties contract may now terminate, modify, or liquidate assets of the 
debtor unhindered by the bankruptcy filing of a debtor, irrespective 
of whether the debtor is in default under the contract or agreement. 
Further, if counterparties hold other assets of the debtor they can 
typically effect an “offset” so long as they can enforce their rights 
against such assets without having to require the assistance of the 
debtor. Thus, in general, the rights of counterparties to derivatives 
transactions with respect to collateral and its liquidation are derived 
from the contract or agreement between the protected party and the 
debtor, as opposed to the bankruptcy code. 
                                                                                                                 
7 The qualifier “typically” must be used because some of the Code’s provisions 
depend on the characteristics of the counterparty. A counterparty to an option, for 
example, can seize collateral only if it is a “commodity broker, forward contract 
merchant, stockbroker, financial institution[], or securities clearing agency.” 
§362(b)(6). In contrast, any counterparty to a swap agreement can seize collateral. 
For closer analysis of these provisions, see Harold S. Novikoff, Special Bankruptcy 
Code Protections for Derivative and Other Financial Market Transactions (2002) 
(working paper). 
8 See §362(b)(6), (7), (17). The Code adds provisions that protect the counter-
party’s right to terminate contracts and seize collateral. First, the counterparty’s 
contractual right to terminate the contract when the debtor becomes insolvent is not 
treated as a voidable “ipso facto” clause. §§ 555, 556, 559, 560. And a debtor’s 
eve-of-bankruptcy margin payments to a counterparty are not considered either 
preferential, §546(c),(f),(g), or fraudulent, §548(d)(2)(B),(C),(D), provided the 
payments were not intentionally fraudulent. For in-depth analysis of these provi-
sions, see Novikoff, supra note 7. 
9 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330, 764(c). 
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The exceptions are set to grow. Recently proposed legislation10 
would, among other things, extend the bankruptcy stay exemption to 
a wide variety of equity and credit derivative transactions, and would 
further extend the rights of counterparties to enforce netting ar-
rangements documented under the International Swaps and Deriva-
tives Association (ISDA) Master Agreements. Specifically, it would 
extend close-out netting between swap agreements, on the one hand, 
and securities and forward contracts, on the other hand.  
Why are derivatives contracts treated differently? If legislative 
history is to be credited,11 Congress reasoned that special treatment of 
derivatives was necessary to prevent the “insolvency of one com-
modity or security firm [from] spreading to other firms and possibly 
threatening the collapse of the affected market.”12 It believed that: 
“The prompt liquidation of an insolvent’s position is generally desir-
able to minimize the potentially massive losses and chain reaction of 
insolvencies that could occur if the market were to move sharply in 
the wrong direction.”13 Congress, then, carved derivatives out of the 
scope of the automatic stay in order to reduce the likelihood of sys-
temic risk, i.e., the possibility that insolvency of a party to a deriva-
tives contract might expose a counterparty and that counterparty’s 
counterparties to financial distress, which would destabilize financial 
markets. 
Congress’ concern with systemic risk has some basis. Fear that a 
counterparty insolvency could trigger a systemic meltdown in the 
OTC derivatives market stems partly from the fact that this market is 
dominated by a few large international banks and securities firms.14 
The ten largest OTC derivatives dealers are counterparties to most of 
the derivatives transactions that take place, and seven U.S. banks 
hold over 95 percent of the U.S. banking system’s notional deriva-
tives exposure.15 This raises the possibility that a problem (such as in-
                                                                                                                 
10 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2004, S. 1920, 108th Cong. § 907 (2004); Financial Contracts Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 2003, H.R. 2120, 108th Cong. § 8 (2003). 
11 The origins of the legislation could, of course, be explored using public 
choice theory. We do not undertake this line of analysis here, largely because we 
are concerned with social-efficiency-based justifications for the Code’s special 
treatment of derivatives contracts. 
12 H.R. Rep. No. 97-420, at 3 (1982). 
13 Id. 
14 See generally Franklin R. Edwards, OTC Derivatives Markets and Financial 
Fragility, J. Fin. Serv. Res. (Dec. 1995). 
15 UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BANK 
DERIVATIVES REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2002, at 1. 
8solvency) with a major derivatives dealer (i.e., a bank) could rever-
berate throughout the entire OTC derivatives market and cause finan-
cial distress far beyond derivatives markets. 
While Congress’ concern with systemic risk is understandable, 
its decision to address it through the Bankruptcy Code is deeply puz-
zling. At the very least, the language of the Code encompasses far too 
many transactions. Fear of systemic risk is warranted only in cases 
involving the insolvency of a major financial market participant, with 
whom other firms have entered derivatives contracts of massive 
value and volume. Yet the Code offers special treatment to deriva-
tives no matter how large or small the counterparty. Thus, Congress’ 
stated justification for the special treatment is incomplete, as it ap-
plies only to a fraction of all firms that enter into derivatives con-
tracts.  
At the same time, the Code’s special treatment of derivatives 
contracts seems far too narrow. Fear of systemic risk justifies special 
treatment of a broad range of financial market transactions and par-
ticipants, especially commercial banks. Indeed, fear of systemic risk 
originated in the banking sector, yet a bank cannot seize collateral 
whenever a debtor firm enters bankruptcy. Surely the risks that (ap-
parently) motivated Congress’ concern with derivatives are equally 
present when Enron, WorldCom, or United Airlines enters bank-
ruptcy and, say, Chase Manhattan cannot collect its collateral (if it is 
a secured creditor) or expects only a few cents on the dollar (if it is 
unsecured) when the case concludes several years later. Yet nothing 
in the Code allows Chase to collect its collateral; nothing in the Code 
gives Chase or any other bank priority in payment when the case con-
cludes. If systemic risk arises from transactions other than derivatives 
contracts, as it undoubtedly does, the Code’s singular focus on de-
rivatives contracts is puzzling.  
It might be argued that this singular focus merely reflects the re-
ality that commercial banks are subject to federal regulation while 
many derivatives counterparties are not. We do not fear a systemic 
collapse when Chase is unable to collect collateral from Enron be-
cause, thanks to capital requirements and other regulatory and super-
visory constraints, Chase is unlikely to become financially distressed. 
This argument is troubling for two reasons. First, it seems odd to 
regulate some financial institutions directly (through capital require-
ments and the like) and others indirectly (through the Bankruptcy 
Code). The costs of direct regulation are borne by the institution it-
self; the costs of indirect regulation through the Code are borne by 
other creditors of a distressed firm. More importantly, it seems highly 
unlikely that the Code is an effective means of reducing systemic 
risk, as we show in the next section. 
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II. CAN THE BANKRUPTCY CODE REDUCE SYSTEMIC RISK? 
An answer to this question was suggested recently during the in-
solvency of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), a limited-
partnership hedge fund founded in 1994.16 LTCM was highly lever-
aged and its operations in derivatives markets were broad and com-
plex. While approximately 80 percent of LTCM’s balance sheet posi-
tions were in seemingly safe treasury securities of major industrial 
countries, these were highly leveraged, at a ratio of 28-to-1 on-
balance sheet as of August 31, 1998. And LTCM’s off-balance sheet 
leverage was much greater. As of August 31, 1998, it held derivatives 
of about U.S. $1.4 trillion in notional value on a capital base of ap-
proximately U.S. $2.3 billion.17 LTCM held OTC swap contracts with 
a gross notional value in excess of $750 billion, futures contracts 
with a gross notional value in excess of $500 billion, and options and 
other derivatives with a notional value in excess of $150 billion. It is 
estimated that LTCM had between 20,000 and 60,000 trades on its 
books, and that it had more than 75 counterparties to its derivatives 
contracts.18 
After a series of large losses during 1998, by September 1998 
LTCM had lost 50 percent of its equity and was in danger of not be-
ing able to meet the collateral obligations on its derivatives positions. 
Only the timely intervention of the Federal Reserve in organizing a 
creditor-bailout of LTCM in September 1998 prevented LTCM’s de-
fault and collapse. A consortium of 14 banks and securities firms, the 
large creditors of LTCM, recapitalized LTCM to the tune of U.S. $3.6 
billion and took over the responsibility and obligations of resolving 
LTCM’s financial difficulties. In essence, LTCM’s large counterpar-
ties participated in a Federal-Reserve-organized out-of-court “work-
out” for LTCM. Why was the intervention of the Federal Reserve 
necessary to do what one might expect could be done under standard 
bankruptcy law?  
                                                                                                                 
16 For a discussion of LTCM and the Federal-Reserve-led creditor rescue of 
LTCM, see Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management, J. Econ. Persp. 189 (Spring 1999). 
17 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 11-12 
(1999); UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO FOCUS GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC 
RISK 7 (1999). 
18 Id.; Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the House Comm. On Agricul-
ture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 105th Cong. 5 (1998) (statement of William 
McDonough, President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York) (“McDonough State-
ment”). 
10
In explaining the role of the Federal Reserve, William 
McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgment that the 
“abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose 
unacceptable risks to the American economy.”19 According to 
McDonough, the rush of more than 75 counterparties to close out si-
multaneously hundreds of billions of dollars of derivatives contracts 
would have adversely affected many market participants with no 
connection to LTCM and would have resulted in tremendous uncer-
tainty about how far prices might move. According to McDonough, 
“[u]nder these circumstances, there was a likelihood that a number of 
credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price 
moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more 
days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a 
loss of investor confidence, leading to further liquidations of posi-
tions, and so on.”20 (At the time LTCM’s own estimate was that its 
largest 17 counterparties, in closing out their positions with LTCM, 
would have incurred losses in the aggregate of between U.S. $3 bil-
lion and U.S. $5 billion, with some individual firms losing as much 
as $500 million.21)  
At the root of the Federal Reserve’s concern was the current U.S. 
insolvency law.22 As we have seen, current U.S. bankruptcy law ex-
empts derivatives counterparties from the normal operation of the 
bankruptcy code: from the automatic stay provisions of the code. 
Thus, LTCM’s derivatives counterparties could have terminated and 
liquidated their derivatives contracts with LTCM. Had this occurred, 
the effects would have been analogous to a “bank run” on LTCM’s 
assets, possibly resulting in the systemic ramifications articulated by 
Federal Reserve officials. As economists have argued recently, bank 
runs can cause or exacerbate liquidity shortages, resulting in systemic 
illiquidity with the potential to cause widespread contagion.23 A run 
                                                                                                                 
19 McDonough Statement. 
20 Id. 
21 See Paul Roth and Brian Fortune, Hedge Fund Regulation in the Aftermath of 
Long-Term Capital Management, in HEDGE FUNDS: LAW AND REGULATION (Iain 
Cullen and Helen Parry, eds., 2001). 
22 Cayman Islands bankruptcy law was also a concern, because LTCM’s sole 
general partner was a Cayman Islands limited partnership. The Fed analyzed the 
implications of bankruptcy filings in both the U.S. and abroad. See PRESIDENT’S 
WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 17, at Appendix E (“Bank-
ruptcy Issues”) (1999). 
23 Douglas Diamond and Raghuram Rajan, Liquidity Shortages and Banking 
Crises (August 2003) (working paper). 
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by derivatives counterparties of the kind that could have occurred in 
the LTCM episode seems similar to a bank run in that it too could re-
sult in the immediate and widespread liquidation of assets at firesale 
prices.  
In contrast, the financial instability that (Congress feared) might 
arise if derivatives transactions were not exempt from the automatic 
stay seems less systemic in nature and less likely to destabilize finan-
cial markets. Congress worried that losses by a derivatives counter-
party could trigger “a chain reaction of insolvencies” by making it 
impossible for a counterparty experiencing losses to meet its obliga-
tions to other counterparties. In general, this is implausible. Although 
a derivatives counterparty might suffer greater losses if it were not 
able quickly to terminate and close out its positions with a finan-
cially-stressed counterparty, this is also true for most other creditors 
of the firm (those subject to the automatic stay provision). In this 
sense derivatives counterparties seem no different than other credi-
tors, and we rarely worry about a “chain reaction of insolvencies” 
when, say, United Airlines defaults on obligations to its vendors.  
A “chain reaction of insolvencies” might, however, be worri-
some in two situations. One is where a distressed counterparty is a 
particularly large player in the market and suffers distress as a result 
of unanticipated economic turmoil that reduces market liquidity. 
LTCM’s distress, for example, was precipitated by Russia’s devalua-
tion of the ruble and declaration of a debt moratorium in August 
1998.24 This unexpected event led to a so-called “flight” to liquidity 
and quality: investors sold-off or avoided high-risk, illiquid financial 
products and gravitated toward safer, more liquid instruments, 
sharply increasing yield spreads. LTCM suffered massive losses as 
yield spreads widened around the world, and found itself on the verge 
of default in a highly illiquid market.25 
Suppose that LTCM had filed a bankruptcy petition and, thanks 
to the Code’s special treatment of derivatives contracts, its counter-
parties had closed out their contracts and seized collateral. Would this 
have avoided the risk of a “chain reaction” of insolvencies? No. In-
deed, it would have exacerbated the risk. As one of us has explained 
elsewhere,26 wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s assets would have 
benefited few counterparties (prices would have collapsed long be-
fore most would have had a chance to liquidate their positions) and 
could have had serious “knock-on” effects because other counterpar-
                                                                                                                 
24 See Edwards, supra note 16, at 199-200. 
25 Id. 
26 Id., at 202. 
12
ties and other banks and financial firms held positions similar to 
LTCM’s. Thus, counterparties could have suffered large losses and 
been forced to default on their own obligations to other parties, re-
sulting in precisely the same “chain reaction of insolvencies” that 
Congress sought to avoid by exempting derivatives from the stay. 
This explains why LTCM’s counterparties did not attempt to close 
out their positions and seize collateral when LTCM entered financial 
distress. Instead, with encouragement from the Fed, they put an addi-
tional $3.6 billion into LTCM to ensure that it remained solvent so 
that they would have time to unwind LTCM’s derivatives positions in 
an orderly fashion. For the counterparties, the additional investment 
in a failing LTCM was obviously viewed as less costly than the ex-
pected losses from the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions 
and collateral. As the President’s Working Group on Financial Mar-
kets put it, “[t]he self-interest of these firms was to find an alternative 
resolution that cost less than they could expect to lose in the event of 
default.”27 
A “chain reaction of insolvencies” may also be a possibility if 
the distressed counterparty is a particularly large player in the market 
and counterparties generally failed to employ sound risk management 
procedures when dealing with the distressed counterparty. Deriva-
tives counterparties, like all other creditors, have strong incentives to 
manage their credit risks prudently so that losses do not cause them 
financial distress. The insolvency of a small derivatives counterparty 
should not result in a “chain reaction” effect because losses will be 
small, and even the insolvency of a large counterparty like LTCM 
should not have this effect unless its counterparties behaved impru-
dently in their dealings with the distressed counterparty (which may 
have been the case with LTCM28). But the better solution to this fail-
ure is better risk management by counterparties, rather than amend-
ments to the bankruptcy code exempting derivatives counterparties 
from its automatic stay provisions. Or, in the case of banks and other 
regulated financial institutions, which constitute the major derivatives 
counterparties in OTC derivatives markets, the answer should be ei-
                                                                                                                 
27 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 17, at 
13. See also Edwards, supra note 16, at 202. 
28 Available evidence suggests that LTCM’s counterparties did indeed behave 
imprudently (by, for example, extending credit at below-market rates and by enter-
ing under-collateralized derivatives contracts without verifying the scale or scope 
of LTCM’s trading operations). See, e.g., UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, supra note 17, at 10-12 (1999); PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, supra note 17, at 14-17. See also Edwards, supra 
note 16, at 204-05. 
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ther better supervision or a regulatory structure that increases incen-
tives to manage counterparty risk more effectively. 
Thus, one view of the potential for LTCM to have caused a sys-
temic crisis is that this crisis was precipitated by the very provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Code that were designed to assure stability in de-
rivatives markets. Had these provisions not been adopted, it is very 
likely that there would not have been either an “abrupt and disorderly 
close-out of LTCM’s positions” or an “unwinding [of] LTCM’s port-
folio in a forced liquidation,” and that there would have been no need 
for the Federal Reserve to intervene to prevent a “seizing up of mar-
kets ... [that] could have potentially impaired the economies of many 
nations, including our own.” While counterparties of LTCM may 
have suffered losses had they been stayed by the Code, it is unlikely 
that these losses would have been large enough to bring down large 
banks and securities firms. If they had been stayed by the Code, 
LTCM’s major creditors almost certainly would have opted to facili-
tate a bankruptcy-supervised creditor “work-out” by putting in more 
capital and reorganizing the ownership structure of LTCM, just as 
they did under the Federal Reserve arranged work-out. Indeed, as 
subsequent events showed, it was clearly in the collective interest of 
LTCM’s counterparties and creditors to avoid a “run” on LTCM and 
the accompanying “firesale” of its assets. Thus, in the absence of the 
Bankruptcy Code’s special treatment of derivatives, Fed intervention 
may have been unnecessary. 
LTCM is not the only large-scale derivatives counterparty to suf-
fer financial distress. Indeed, an even more spectacular failure oc-
curred recently in the form of Enron, which dominated many energy 
derivatives markets. One scholar estimates that Enron made more 
money trading derivatives during the year 2000 than LTCM made in 
its entire history, that is, if we believe Enron’s 2001 10-K.29 Unlike 
LTCM, the federal government did not intervene to help Enron as it 
entered financial distress (despite lobbying efforts by the firm’s 
bankers30). Unlike LTCM, Enron did file a Chapter 11 petition. And 
in stark contrast to the Fed’s expectations in LTCM, Enron’s bank-
ruptcy did not destabilize either energy derivatives markets or finan-
cial markets generally.  
                                                                                                                 
29 Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE FI-
ASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 169 (Nancy B. Rapoport and Bala G. Dharan, eds., 
2004). 
30 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., EN-
RON’S CREDIT RATING: ENRON’S BANKERS’ CONTACTS WITH MOODY’S AND GOV-
ERNMENT OFFICIALS (Comm. Print 2003). 
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This was, to many observers,31 a surprising outcome.32 Indeed, 
the absence of systemic effects in the wake of a major counterparty’s 
collapse might be seen as evidence that the Code’s special treatment 
of derivatives worked as intended. The International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association (ISDA) has made precisely this argument:33 
counterparties were free to terminate contracts and seize collateral, 
thereby minimizing losses. The result might also be seen as evidence 
that the Fed’s concerns in LTCM were misplaced: just as in Enron, 
LTCM’s collapse would not have destabilized financial markets.34 
But Enron’s insolvency presented fundamentally different issues 
than LTCM’s. First, it is not true that Enron’s failure had little effect 
on financial markets. Liquidity in energy markets and many special-
ized markets (such as telecommunications bandwidth trading) col-
lapsed in the wake of the bankruptcy filing.35 What is true, however, 
is that this collapse was not as severe as that experienced in the 
LTCM crises. Also, LTCM’s insolvency was driven by mounting 
losses in its derivatives positions, while Enron’s insolvency was 
driven by sustained and increasing losses in its core non-financial 
businesses covered up by a massive accounting fraud. If its annual 
reports offer any guidance, Enron’s derivatives trading arm was its 
only profitable operation.36 Enron indicated, post-petition, that its de-
                                                                                                                 
31 See, e.g., Upended: The Imminent Bankruptcy of Enron Could Destabilise 
Energy and Financial Markets Around the World, ECONOMIST, Nov. 30, 2001, 
available in LEXIS (predicting that Enron’s imminent collapse would resemble the 
LTCM debacle). 
32 See, e.g., Susan Lee, Editorial, The Dismal Science: Enron’s Success Story, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2001, available in WESTLAW (“At the end of September, 
Enron had 25% of the energy-trading market. Just two months later, its business 
had disappeared but that disappearance didn't cause the tiniest ripple in the market. 
The swift collapse of what once was a $77 billion dollar company failed to generate 
either a price spike or a supply interruption because the market was sufficiently 
liquid and deep to absorb it”); A Fresh Look at Rules for Energy and Finance, Fi-
nancial Times 19, Feb. 19, 2002, available in LEXIS. See also Jacqueline Lang 
Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise and Fall of Enron 
on Energy Markets, Houston Bus. & Tax L. J. 24-25 (forthcoming 2004). 
33 See CFTC Oversight of Derivatives Markets: Hearing Before Senate Comm. 
on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Ernest T. 
Patrikis on behalf of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association); INTER-
NATIONAL SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION (ISDA), ENRON: CORPORATE 
FAILURE, MARKET SUCCESS (April 2002). 
34 George Kaufman raises this possibility in George G. Kaufman, A Proposal for 
Efficiently Resolving Out-of-the-Money Swap Positions at Large Insolvent Banks 
6 n. 6 (Nov. 10, 2003) (working paper). 
35 ISDA, RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ENERGY TRADING MARKETS 9 
(2003). 
36 See Partnoy, supra note 29, at 183 (making this point and reproducing data 
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rivatives trading business accounted for the “lion’s share” of its in-
come.37 Before and after Enron filed its bankruptcy petition in De-
cember 2001, many derivatives counterparties with in-the-money 
contracts with Enron canceled these contracts and seized collateral.38 
But many counterparties had out-of-the-money contracts and Enron 
immediately took steps to collect amounts owed to it (“termination 
payments”).39 These amounts totaled over $3 billion as of November 
2003 (an additional $2.2 billion was sought in litigation against coun-
terparties that terminated contracts that, in Enron’s view, were dis-
guised loans).40 More importantly, Enron’s derivatives trading arm 
continued operating despite the firm’s Chapter 11 filing, and the firm 
moved41 quickly to sell the operation to a third-party (ultimately sell-
ing it to UBS Warburg42), thereby minimizing disruption to OTC 
markets. 
For these reasons the collapse of Enron was much different from 
the collapse of LTCM. Enron’s bankruptcy filing did indeed create a 
“counterparty run” that consumed assets, but the effect of this run 
was limited by the fact that Enron’s trading operations were, it seems, 
largely profitable: some counterparties (with in-the-money positions) 
were free to seize Enron assets, but another large group of counter-
parties (with out-of-the-money positions) found themselves liable to 
Enron. There was no wholesale run on Enron’s assets, and no firesale 
of assets. Although Enron’s collapse did create a liquidity vacuum in 
certain energy derivatives markets, it did not threaten liquidity in 
overall financial markets—something the Fed feared in the LTCM 
crisis.43 Put differently, Enron’s collapse did not pose a risk of a sys-
                                                                                                                 
from Enron’s 2000 income statement). 
37 Response and Objection of Exco Resources, Inc., at 3, In re Enron Corp., No. 
01-16034 (SDNY Bankr. Jan. 8, 2002). 
38 See Emergency Motion for an Order Pursuant to Sections 105 and 363 of the 
Bankruptcy Code and Rule 9019(b) for the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
for Authority to Negotiate and Enter into Termination or Sale Agreements with 
Counterparties to Certain “Safe Harbor” Contracts Without Further Court Ap-
proval, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (SDNY Bankr. Dec. 10, 2001). 
39 Id. 
40 Disclosure Statement for Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors Pur-
suant to Chapter 11 of the United States Code 233-34, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-
16034 (SDNY Bankr. Jan. 9, 2004). 
41 See Motion of Enron Corp. [to Sell Wholesale Trading Business], In re Enron 
Corp., No. 01-16034 (SDNY Bankr. Dec. 14, 2001). 
42 See Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code 
[Approving Sale of Wholesale Trading Arm to UBS Warburg], In re Enron Corp., 
No. 01-16034 (SDNY Bankr. Jan. 22, 2004). 
43 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, 
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temic meltdown generally. Its insolvency, therefore, neither supports 
nor undermines ISDA’s claim that the Code’s special treatment of de-
rivatives minimizes systemic risk nor our claim that the Code can, in 
some cases, exacerbate systemic risk.  
In sum, then, the LTCM episode suggests that the most impor-
tant risk to financial stability may come from the possibility that de-
rivatives counterparties, exempt from the automatic stay provisions 
of the bankruptcy code, may “run” on a financially-distressed coun-
terparty (or firm), causing a liquidity shortage that has the potential to 
spillover to other firms and markets and cause widespread instability 
in financial markets. In contrast, in the absence of a systemic liquid-
ity shortage, there is no reason to think that derivatives counterparties 
could not adequately manage their counterparty risks or could not ab-
sorb counterparty losses without triggering “a chain reaction of in-
solvencies.” 
Does this mean that the Code’s special treatment of derivatives 
contracts is a mistake? Are derivatives contracts no different from 
other contracts and assets of a troubled firm? Not necessarily; in the 
next section we offer an alternative justification for the Code’s treat-
ment of derivatives. The real lesson to draw from the LTCM episode, 
however, is that the systemic risk rationale for exempting derivatives 
contracts does not make much sense. A Bankruptcy Code exemption 
for derivatives offers little help in alleviating the potential systemic 
risk associated with the insolvency of a large derivatives counterparty 
like LTCM, and may even exacerbate or create a systemic risk. The 
better approach to mitigating possible systemic risk from a deriva-
tives counterparty failure is to increase incentives for counterparties 
and creditors to use better risk management procedures, either by en-
hancing market discipline or by more effective regulatory oversight 
of regulated financial institution counterparties. But in the event of a 
market failure, central bank intervention may be the only recourse. 
III. A BETTER REASON FOR TREATING DERIVATIVES DIFFERENTLY 
Derivatives contracts are different. To see why, we need to con-
sider the theoretical foundations for the automatic stay. The stay 
serves the same purposes as government regulation of common-pool 
resources and externality-creating activities.44 As others have noted, a 
firm in distress is analogous to a scarce resource (e.g., fish in a lake) 
                                                                                                                 
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 
17, at 17-22. 
44 In this context "externality-creating" activities are those that may indirectly 
impose costs on other creditors of the firm. 
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to which users have unlimited, non-exclusive rights of access.45 In the 
absence of regulation or the creation of exclusive property rights, the 
resource will be overused. The first user to exploit the resource will 
be satisfied, the last will not; therefore, every user rushes to use the 
resource first. This will be true even if the resource would have more 
value per user if exploited in a more restrained fashion.  
Unsecured creditors have similar incentives to descend upon the 
limited assets of a distressed firm. The first creditor to reach state 
court and obtain a judgment lien will be paid in full; later creditors 
will be paid only cents on the dollar. Thus every creditor rushes to 
dismember the firm, to the disadvantage of all other creditors. Even 
when this rush to the courthouse would not result in premature dis-
memberment of a firm (perhaps the firm plans to liquidate), it is 
nonetheless wasteful. Every creditor incurs legal costs trying to 
monitor other creditors in order to ensure that it is first (or at least not 
last) in line for repayment when the debtor becomes insolvent.46 The 
automatic stay prevents this destructive race, thereby preserving 
firms with going concern value and reducing creditor collection 
costs. 
Secured creditors, on the other hand, would seem to have little 
incentive to take part in this race. They have obtained exclusive 
rights to particular assets of the debtor, i.e., collateral. Yet the auto-
matic stay applies to them too.47 If Bank loaned $1 million to Debtor 
and took a security interest in Debtor’s machinery as collateral, the 
automatic stay prevents Bank from seizing the machinery when 
Debtor stops repaying the loan and files a bankruptcy petition. This is 
because the machines may be essential to Debtor’s viability.48 Re-
moval of collateral benefits the secured creditor but harms other 
creditors by destroying firm value. Bank ignores this harm to other 
creditors because “it has nothing to gain from waiting and attempting 
to keep the firm intact, but … can do worse if the firm continues and 
                                                                                                                 
45 See, e.g., THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
10-13 (Harvard 1986). 
46 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, Bankruptcy and the Administrative State, 42 
Hastings L. J. 1567, 1573-74 (1991). 
47 See 11 USC § 362(a)(5), prohibiting “any act to create, perfect, or enforce 
against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim 
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title.” 
48 See generally, Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reor-
ganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Ade-
quate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 97, 116-21 
(1984); Jackson, Logic and Limits, supra note 45, at 181-83. 
18
its fortunes decline.”49 Thus, even a secured creditor has strong incen-
tives to remove collateral, creating an externality vis-à-vis other 
creditors of the debtor firm. The automatic stay limits this externality 
much as environmental regulation limits environmental externalities. 
This is the traditional view of the automatic stay, which is 
grounded in a traditional view of Chapter 11: that troubled firms use 
Chapter 11 to establish a collective proceeding that preserves firms 
with going-concern surplus and reduces creditor collection costs. Re-
cent scholarship questions this view of Chapter 11 and suggests that, 
in modern practice, Chapter 11 is primarily a vehicle for selling as-
sets or implementing a capital restructuring plan devised by a major-
ity of creditors.50 Outside of Chapter 11, these goals may be difficult 
or impossible to achieve.51 Under this revisionist view, the automatic 
stay functions simply to prevent actions (by the debtor or its credi-
tors) that might disrupt a proposed sale or agreed-upon restructuring. 
This account of the automatic stay differs from the traditional ac-
count only in cases where creditor conduct might disrupt, say, a pro-
posed sale but would neither induce a costly rush to the courthouse 
nor generate other externalities. Such cases are probably rare: it is 
hard to identify creditor conduct that would harm a firm’s sale value 
but not its going-concern value, or would benefit the individual credi-
tor but not generate costly competition among other creditors to ob-
tain the same advantage.52 
                                                                                                                 
49 Baird & Jackson, supra note 48, at 106. 
50 Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan-
ford L. Rev. 751 (2002). 
51 Asset sales outside of bankruptcy are problematic because the seller’s credi-
tors may claim that the sale was a “de facto merger” of the buyer and seller, mean-
ing that the buyer assumed the seller’s liabilities when it purchased the seller’s as-
sets. This problem is avoided in bankruptcy because, under 11 U.S.C. § 363, assets 
are sold free and clear of creditor claims. Similarly, capital restructuring outside of 
bankruptcy is difficult because, under the federal Trust Indenture Act, the most im-
portant terms of a bond indenture (interest and principal) cannot be altered without 
unanimous consent of all bondholders. This problem is avoided in bankruptcy be-
cause, under 1129, debt can be restructured with the consent of creditors holding 
2/3 in value and a majority in number of the claims in each class. Even if such con-
sent is absent, restructuring may still be possible. Dissenting creditors can be 
“crammed down” under certain conditions. See Baird and Rasmussen, supra note 
50, at 786-88. 
52 We are assuming, as do many others, that the primary goals of bankruptcy 
law are to maximize creditor recovery ex post by preserving firms with going-
concern surplus (i.e., firms worth more intact than sold piecemeal) and to encour-
age investment ex ante. See the discussion and citations in Alan Schwartz, A Nor-
mative Theory of Business Bankruptcy (April 2004) (working paper). Alternative 
goals could be proposed: the law might serve to reduce creditor collection costs 
through a collective proceeding in a single federal court (instead of multiple pro-
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A. General Limits on the Stay 
The foregoing view of the Bankruptcy Code suggests natural 
limitations on the scope of the automatic stay: the stay should exempt 
creditor collection efforts that raise no common-resource problem or 
do not generate other externalities that reduce the debtor’s going-
concern value. The Bankruptcy Code does indeed create exceptions 
to the automatic stay, and many exceptions fit within the theory out-
lined above.  
The most important exception is the judge’s discretion, under 
section 362(d), to grant a creditor’s motion to terminate the automatic 
stay with respect to particular assets. A court may grant the motion 
either “for cause” or if the creditor offers proof that the debtor firm 
has no equity in the asset and that the asset is “not necessary to an ef-
fective reorganization.” The automatic stay, then, creates a rebuttable 
presumption that a debtor’s assets are firm-specific and therefore 
“necessary to an effective reorganization.”  
Beyond this general exception to the stay, there are many spe-
cific exceptions targeting particular creditors or particular assets. As 
we noted previously, the stay does not extend to the government’s po-
lice or regulatory power. A debtor cannot avoid criminal prosecution 
or the enforcement of environmental protection laws, and a troubled 
educational institution cannot prevent accrediting agencies from re-
evaluating the institution’s eligibility for state funding.53 In these 
situations, the government is acting as regulator not creditor and is 
therefore not attempting to gain an advantage over other creditors. 
Although the government’s efforts may reduce firm value to the det-
riment of all creditors (e.g., an order to remediate polluted land), the 
reduction in value is the unavoidable result of compliance with law. 
On the other hand, when the government’s regulatory efforts become 
                                                                                                                 
ceedings brought by individual creditors in various state courts); or the law might 
be thought to distribute losses in a manner that promotes particular social policies 
(e.g., favoring employees who are “ill-suited to bear the costs of default” over se-
cured creditors who anticipated default). Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 790(1987). We ignore these goals for two reasons. First, bank-
ruptcy law will play an important role in reducing creditor collection costs only in 
cases where creditor collection efforts generate a common-resource problem. If a 
firm is insolvent, creditors will race to dismember the firm; bankruptcy law will 
prevent this destructive race and, at the same time, reduce collection costs. If a firm 
is solvent (or not expected to become insolvent), creditors have little or no incen-
tive to dismember the firm. Second, like many other scholars, we suspect that bank-
ruptcy is a poor vehicle for promoting social welfare policies. See generally 
Schwartz, supra, as well as Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 
108 Yale L. J. 573 (1998); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy 
Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1. 
53 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(1), (4), (14),(15), (16). 
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debt-collection efforts (as when the state seeks compensation for pre-
petition remediation efforts), the automatic stay steps into place.54 
Another exception to the automatic stay ensures that the Bank-
ruptcy Code does not alter the substantive state-law rights of one 
creditor vis-a-vis others. Consider a Vendor that sold equipment to 
Debtor on credit; to ensure repayment, the sale agreement gave Ven-
dor a security interest in the equipment. This security interest, how-
ever, is not enforceable against subsequent lenders (who may also use 
the equipment as collateral) unless Vendor “perfects” the security in-
terest by filing a financing statement with the appropriate state offi-
cial (usually the secretary of state). What if Debtor files a bankruptcy 
petition after receiving the equipment but before Vendor has per-
fected its security interest? Although the automatic stay would gener-
ally prevent Vendor from taking steps to perfect its interest, section 
362(b)(3) creates an exception: provided Debtor filed the petition 
only a few days after receiving the equipment, Vendor may perfect its 
security interest by filing a financing statement with the appropriate 
public official.55 This rule ensures that Vendor has the same right to 
perfect a security interest in bankruptcy that it would have enjoyed 
outside of bankruptcy.56 More importantly, this exception to the 
automatic stay permits acts that generate neither common-pool prob-
lems nor other externalities that reduce firm value. When Vendor per-
fects a security interest, it is merely announcing rights to collateral 
pursuant to a contract. There is no rush to seize assets; there is no ad-
verse effect on the viability of the firm. 
Other exceptions make clear that the automatic stay has no effect 
on creditor efforts to reach property that is not part of the debtor’s es-
tate. Thus, a creditor may present a check or other negotiable instru-
ment to the debtor, have it dishonored, and then seek payment from a 
guarantor.57 And a landlord may repossess commercial real estate if 
the terms of the lease have expired; such property is not part of the 
debtor’s estate.58 In each case it is obvious that the creditor’s collec-
                                                                                                                 
54 See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). More generally, see the dis-
cussion in Rasmussen, supra note 52, at 1596-1602. 
55 This narrow exception is available only to suppliers who sold goods on credit 
to the debtor no more than 20 days before the debtor filed a bankruptcy petition. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3); UCC. § 9-317(e). 
56 Outside of bankruptcy, Vendor has twenty days to perfect its interest and 
claim priority to the collateral (other than inventory). It would enjoy the same pri-
ority even if another creditor obtains a security interest in the same collateral and 
perfects its interest before Vendor does. UCC § 9-324(a). 
57 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(11). 
58 § 362(b)(10). 
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tion efforts generate neither common-pool problems nor externalities. 
The creditors are seizing assets that no longer belong to the debtor. 
B. Cash and the Automatic Stay 
Perhaps the most important limitations on the automatic stay in-
volve cash and cash equivalents. The Bankruptcy Code freezes any 
cash, securities, or other “cash equivalents” in which a creditor has 
taken a security interest, no matter where that cash was deposited. 
Unless the creditor consents—or unless the court finds good reasons 
for overcoming the creditor’s lack of consent—the debtor cannot use 
the “cash collateral.”59 At the same time, the creditor cannot use the 
collateral either. The creditor remains obligated to return the collat-
eral to the debtor either when the court orders its return or when the 
debtor complies with the terms of the underlying contract. 
A similar set of rules govern “setoffs.” Frequently a firm and its 
creditor have offsetting obligations. A commercial bank will extend a 
loan to the firm, which in turn deposits cash in an account at the 
bank; a landlord will lease real estate to the firm and the firm will 
post a deposit; an investment bank will extend a loan and the firm 
will pledge securities as collateral. In each case the firm is indebted 
to a creditor, but the creditor is also indebted to the firm (the land-
lord, for example, must return the deposit if the firm honors the terms 
of the lease). And under state law, each has a right of setoff: the 
creditor may offset debt owed to the firm against debts owed by the 
firm. When the firm files a bankruptcy petition, this right of setoff is 
only partially limited by the automatic stay.60 Although the stay pre-
vents each creditor from exercising its right of setoff and seizing any 
cash posted by the debtor,61 the stay nevertheless does permit the 
creditor to limit the debtor’s ability to use this “cash collateral” (i.e., 
cash or cash equivalents, such as securities, that serve as collateral62). 
A commercial bank can freeze the debtor’s account, at least tempo-
rarily.63 A landlord (or an investment bank) can retain a deposit (or 
margin), unless the debtor proves to the court that the landlord’s in-
                                                                                                                 
59 § 363(c)(2). 
60 § 553(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this section and in sections 362 
and 363 of this title, this title does not affect any rights of a creditor to offset a mu-
tual debt owing by such creditor to the debtor that arose before the commencement 
of the case under this title against a claim of such creditor against the debtor that 
arose before the commencement of the case ….”). 
61 § 362(a)(7). 
62 § 363(a). 
63 Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16 (1995). 
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terest64 in the deposit will be “adequately protected” by the debtor 
taking possession.65 
Along the same lines, the automatic stay does not prevent a 
creditor from unilaterally terminating a contract to loan money to a 
debtor firm. Generally, the stay prevents any contractual partner from 
terminating ongoing (“executory”) contracts with a firm that has filed 
a bankruptcy petition. The debtor firm is given the exclusive right–
for a limited period–to choose whether to continue (“assume”) or 
terminate (“reject”) ongoing contracts. The Code, however, carves 
out an exception for contracts “to make a loan, or extend debt financ-
ing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, 
or to issue a security of the debtor.”66 
The Code’s treatment of cash, cash equivalents, and contracts to 
loan cash may seem puzzling. After all, a creditor generally cannot 
place a “freeze” on collateral. If Bank has taken a security interest in 
a firm’s plant or equipment, it cannot prevent the firm from using the 
plant or equipment in its operations. What distinguishes this example 
from the previous ones, we believe, is asset specificity. Plant and 
equipment may be firm-specific or industry-specific assets. Cash is 
never specialized; it is a fungible asset.  
This distinction–between specialized and fungible assets–is 
critical to the economic theory of corporate reorganization.67 A firm is 
worth reorganizing if its assets generate greater value in their current 
configuration than in a market sale. This difference is generally 
called “going concern surplus.” It exists, however, only if the firm’s 
assets are worth more to the firm than to any outsider. This asymme-
try arises when assets are customized to meet a firm’s idiosyncratic 
needs or the needs of firms in the same industry (examples include 
airplanes, railroad tracks, and brewery equipment). These specialized 
assets cannot be readily redeployed by other firms (if the assets are 
firm-specific) or by firms outside the industry (if they are industry-
specific). As a result, plant, equipment, and other specialized assets 
are relatively illiquid: there are few buyers for the assets, and any po-
                                                                                                                 
64 And the landlord’s interest is limited by § 502(b)(6), which puts a cap on the 
damages a landlord can claim for breach of a lease of real estate. 
65 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 207 (1983). 
66 §365(c)(2). 
67 We are hardly the first to make this point. For similar arguments, see Viral V. 
Acharya, Rangarajan K. Sundaram, and Kose A. John, On the Capital-Structure 
Implications of Bankruptcy Codes (March 28, 2004) (working paper); Douglas G. 
Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673, 685-
93 (2003); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 
Stan. L. Rev. 751, 768-777 (2002). 
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tential buyers will value the assets significantly less than the seller 
does.68 A basic function of bankruptcy law is to protect these illiquid 
assets. If creditors could seize and sell these assets, they would fetch 
“fire sale” prices and the firm’s going-concern surplus would be de-
stroyed.69 
The same cannot be said for cash and other fungible assets. They 
are worth as much to the firm as they are to outsiders; a $100 bill is 
worth $100 whether it is held by the firm or by one of its competi-
tors. Indeed, cash is the benchmark liquid asset; many financial in-
struments are almost nearly as liquid. No firm derives going-concern 
surplus from its holdings of cash or similarly liquid instruments 
(which explains why insolvent broker-dealers are liquidated, not re-
organized70). To be sure, the firm may need access to cash in order to 
run its operations and preserve going concern surplus. But there is 
nothing about cash collateral (cash in which a creditor has rights) that 
makes it more important to a firm’s survival than cash available from 
any potential lender. If the Code allowed a bankrupt firm free access 
to cash collateral, it would effectively force creditors to extend new 
loans to the debtor on non-competitive terms. But the Code generally 
does not force loans, and in some cases it does just the opposite. 
Thus, under section 365(c)(2), a debtor cannot force lenders to honor 
pre-bankruptcy commitments to extend credit. The debtor is forced to 
seek credit (“debtor-in-possession financing”) on competitive terms. 
A puzzle remains, however. Why does the Code merely freeze 
cash collateral? The theory developed here suggests that the auto-
matic stay should allow a secured creditor both to freeze and seize 
cash collateral when a debtor seeks bankruptcy protection. The Code, 
however, not only prohibits the creditor from seizing the collateral, 
but also creates an opportunity for the debtor to use the cash collat-
                                                                                                                 
68 See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. 
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69 Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A 
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ruptcy law, these assets would be sold at fire-sale prices to lower-value users out-
side the industry; the assets will not be purchased by higher-valuing users within 
the same industry because they too are suffering distress and are therefore liquidity 
constrained. For empirical evidence supporting this theory, see Per Stromberg, 
Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and 
Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641 (2000); Todd C. Pulvino, Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Em-
pirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Sale Transactions, 53 J. Fin. 939 
(1998). 
70 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(d), 741, et seq.; 15 U.S.C. § 78111, et seq. 
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eral over the creditor’s objection. If the bankruptcy judge is con-
vinced that the debtor can “adequately protect”71 the creditor’s inter-
est in the collateral, the judge may allow the debtor to use the collat-
eral. Here we see a case where the Code can in fact force existing 
creditors to “loan” cash collateral to the debtor. This provision of the 
Code is troubling. Logically, it does not sit well with other provi-
sions: although a debtor cannot force creditors to honor pre-existing 
agreements to loan cash in their possession, the debtor can force the 
same creditors to loan cash in the debtor’s possession. Equally trou-
bling is the well-known danger that judges will force loans on terms 
that are less favorable than comparable loans negotiated in the mar-
ketplace.72 
Although troubling, we might make some sense of the Code’s 
treatment of cash collateral by looking more closely at the extent to 
which it is a firm-specific asset. Cash is indeed the benchmark fungi-
ble asset, but it is frequently not easy to replace. As economists have 
shown empirically,73 lending relationships are valuable. A bank gen-
erally gathers extensive information about its borrowers, and the 
closer the relationship between a bank and borrower, the greater the 
availability of financing. Because of this phenomenon, a troubled 
firm has strong incentives to continue dealing with existing creditors 
and can face a hold-up problem if the Bankruptcy Code gave credi-
tors free reign to seize cash collateral. The Code helps protect a 
firm’s investment in pre-existing lending relationships and reduces 
hold-up problems by prohibiting creditors from seizing cash collat-
eral. At the same time, the Code recognizes that cash is not a firm-
specific asset and prohibits the firm from using it unless the secured 
creditor consents or the court gives permission. The Code therefore 
abandons the usual rebuttable presumption that assets are firm-
specific. Instead, with respect to cash, it creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the assets are not firm specific. A debtor firm can over-
come this presumption either by convincing the secured creditor to 
permit access to the cash collateral or by convincing the court that it 
                                                                                                                 
71 Just as a bank typically will not extend credit without assurance of repay-
ment, a court will not permit access to cash collateral unless the debtor can assure 
the creditor that it will be no worse off as a result. This assurance–or “adequate 
protection”–may come in the form of a lien on newly-acquired assets or a promise 
to make periodic cash payments in the future (if debtor owns an apartment com-
plex, for example, it might assign future rents to the creditor). 
72 See, e.g., George Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Laws of Secured 
Transactions, 29 J. Legal Stud. 35, 67-68 (2000). 
73 See generally Mitchell A. Peterson and Raghuram G. Rajan, The Benefits of 
Firm-Creditor Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data, 49 J. Fin. 3 
(1994). 
 Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code 25 
should permit access over the creditor’s objection. 
This argument is not wholly satisfactory. Although lending rela-
tionships are important firm-specific assets, would these relationships 
be destroyed if lenders were free to seize cash collateral? Lending re-
lationships are the product of bilateral investments by the lender and 
the borrower; a bank generally has as much interest in continuing a 
relationship as does the borrower. If lenders were free to seize cash 
collateral, debtor firms would be forced to apply for new loans and 
might be vulnerable to hold-up problems. But this phenomenon is 
largely a distributional concern. The bargaining power of the pre-
existing lender may enable it to extend credit on terms that are less 
favorable to the debtor, but the loan will be made in any event. 
Moreover, if hold-up problems are significant in bankruptcy, the 
Code’s provisions for cash collateral are patently inadequate. Most 
firms enter bankruptcy with little in the way of cash. They may, how-
ever, enter bankruptcy with lines of credit or other commitments 
from lenders to extend cash. Yet the Code does nothing to protect 
these commitments. The debtor is forced to bargain anew with pre-
existing creditors.  
It is possible, then, that the terms of the automatic stay are over-
broad and provide too much protection for cash collateral. This ob-
servation may help explain the popularity of asset securitization, a 
practice in which debtors obtain financing by selling assets (typically 
receivables and other assets that generate cash collateral) to a sepa-
rate legal entity, which then issues debt claims to creditors.74 Because 
the assets are owned by a separate legal entity, they are beyond the 
reach of the automatic stay when the debtor files a bankruptcy peti-
tion. Asset securitization, then, can negate the Code’s overbroad rules 
governing cash collateral. 
IV. DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
Unlike cash collateral, nothing prevents a counterparty from 
closing out existing contracts, netting them, and then seizing collat-
eral, which generally consists of cash, treasury bills, and other finan-
cial instruments.75 These provisions governing derivatives contracts 
make sense under the simple theory of the automatic stay outlined in 
                                                                                                                 
74 See, e.g., New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 Bus. Lawyer 95 
(2000). 
75 U.S. dollars and government securities account for about 75% of collateral 
posted by derivatives counterparties; foreign currency, major index equities, AAA-
rated bonds, and other securities make up the balance. INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND 
DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION, INC., ISDA COLLATERAL SURVEY 29 (2000). 
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the previous section. Derivatives contracts are fungible, replaceable 
assets much like cash; indeed, the Code’s definition of “cash collat-
eral” lumps cash and financial securities together. Just as a firm’s go-
ing-concern surplus will rarely depend on its cash holdings, its sur-
plus will rarely depend on its derivatives contracts or the collateral 
posted to support those contracts. If one contract is canceled, it can 
typically be replaced with an identical contract. If a counterparty 
seizes government securities posted as collateral, these securities are 
easily replaced. For this reason, common-pool problems and other 
externalities will rarely (if ever) arise when a counterparty cancels a 
derivatives contract with an insolvent debtor and seizes collateral. 
This theory of derivatives contracts and the automatic stay is 
fairly straightforward in cases involving financial enterprises, such as 
hedge funds, that become insolvent. The assets of these firms consist 
entirely of financial contracts. Although much talent and energy may 
have been spent to assemble and manage its contracts, there is little 
or no going-concern surplus in an insolvent hedge fund. If a fund is 
insolvent, it is because the value of its portfolio has diminished, at 
least in the short term. The portfolio may increase in value in the 
long-term, but this is not a reason to attempt to reorganize the firm. 
The firm’s assets are fungible and its long-run potential is not de-
stroyed when these assets are seized by creditors. Provided the man-
agers can prove that this long-run potential exists (something the 
managers would have to do even if the firm were reorganized under 
Chapter 11), outside investors would be willing to pay the firm to re-
assemble the portfolio. To be sure, transaction costs will be incurred 
when the firm reassembles its portfolio, but the small costs of trading 
in financial markets seem trivial compared to the costs that would be 
borne by counterparties forced to participate in the bankruptcy proc-
ess76 and continue dealing with a firm that may be unable to demon-
strate its long-run potential. Indeed, if we are wrong about hedge 
funds, then broker-dealers too should be treated differently under the 
Code and the Securities Investor Protection Act, which automatically 
liquidate broker-dealers.77 
                                                                                                                 
76 Professional fee and expense awards (which make up only a fraction of total 
expenses incurred by the debtor and its creditors) consume about 2% of firm value. 
Lynn M. LoPucki and Joseph Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in 
Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, UCLA Law and Economics Research Pa-
per No. 03-14 (June 2003). 
77 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(d), 741, et seq.; 15 U.S.C. 78111, et seq. 
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Our claim—that the automatic stay should permit derivatives 
counterparties to cancel contracts and seize collateral—is more com-
plicated when we consider non-financial enterprises such as manu-
facturing, energy supply, and telecommunications concerns. When a 
counterparty cancels a derivatives contract and seizes collateral, it 
may expose the distressed firm to increased risk that reduces the 
value of its non-financial assets. The firm may have entered the de-
rivatives contract in the first place to hedge particular risks, such as 
interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations. This hedge disappears 
when a counterparty cancels a derivatives contract. The increased ex-
posure to, say, exchange-rate risk can harm the firm’s operations and 
its other creditors.  
Again, however, the harm to the firm is equal to the counter-
party’s gain: upon cancellation of the contract, the firm loses a hedge 
against, say, interest-rate fluctuations and the counterparty ceases 
providing this hedge. The firm can regain the benefits of hedging 
simply by entering a new derivatives contract. To be sure, a firm in 
bankruptcy generally will be unable to replace a derivatives contract 
on precisely the same terms. New counterparties will charge a pre-
mium to deal with a distressed firm, which may be unable to perform 
its future obligations under the contract. The premium may be so 
high that the firm can no longer hedge certain risks; as a result, firm 
value may fall, to the detriment of all creditors.  
Put this way, it may seem that a derivatives counterparty im-
poses an externality on other creditors when it unilaterally cancels a 
contract. But this is what economists call a “pecuniary externality” 
and is present in any competitive market (indeed, pecuniary external-
ities are the mechanism guaranteeing Pareto optimal outcomes in 
competitive markets).78 Unlike a secured creditor that seizes the 
debtor’s core assets and thereby directly reduces the value of the 
firm, the derivatives counterparty cancels a contract and thereby indi-
rectly reduces firm value by raising the price it must pay to hedge 
risk.79 The same pecuniary externality occurs when a firm is denied 
access to cash collateral: by denying access to cash, a secured lender 
forces the firm to seek financing in the marketplace, where it will of-
ten face high credit costs due to its financial condition.80 
                                                                                                                 
78 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 7 (Aspen 5th ed. 
1998). 
79 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, AND JERRY R. GREEN, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 352 (1995). 
80 The same is equally true of insurance contracts, yet some courts have held 
that the automatic stay prevents an insurer from canceling a policy simply because 
the debtor firm has entered bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Cahokia Downs, 5 Bankr. 
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Further, a firm’s gong-concern value is unlikely to be affected by 
having to replace its derivatives contracts. To illustrate, consider a 
typical fixed-income derivative, the interest-rate swap. For both sol-
vent and insolvent firms, the cost of entering a new derivatives con-
tract is typically the same as continuing an existing one. A large frac-
tion (perhaps all) of swaps contracts are collateralized, meaning that 
the counterparties post liquid assets (typically cash and U.S. govern-
ment securities) as collateral to support their obligations under the 
contracts.81 Additionally, most of these contracts are “marked to mar-
ket” at least daily,82 meaning that the counterparties effectively settle 
their existing contract and reenter an identical contract every day. 
Thus, for most firms, little or no cost is incurred when one contract is 
replaced with another. The same is true for both solvent and insolvent 
firms, with one exception–any firm with a poor financial history, not 
merely a firm in bankruptcy, might be required to post margin when 
the contract is first signed. Swaps, then, provide a nice illustration of 
the phenomenon that a firm’s going-concern value will rarely, if ever, 
depend upon its derivatives contracts. 
The foregoing discussion is undoubtedly controversial, particu-
larly because it calls for a major revision of the Bankruptcy Code 
(secured creditors should be free to seize cash collateral). We doubt 
Congress would embrace a reform that makes it more difficult for 
firms, especially small businesses, to access cash and, ultimately, re-
organize. The controversial features of our analysis, however, under-
score the difficulty in justifying the Code’s special treatment of de-
rivatives contracts. If the Code can do little to reduce systemic risk 
(which, we think, is clear) and if our theory of the automatic stay is in 
error, then there is no principled reason for treating derivatives differ-
ently. 
V. EX ANTE EFFECTS OF TREATING DERIVATIVES DIFFERENTLY 
Our analysis is incomplete, as it has focused entirely on the ex 
post costs and benefits of the Code’s treatment of derivatives con-
tracts. From an ex ante perspective, two effects are notable: first, the 
Code lowers the cost of hedging risk generally, by reducing costs to 
counterparties from entering contracts with firms that might suffer 
                                                                                                                 
529 (S.D. Ill. 1980). 
81 Michael S. Johannes and Suresh Sundaresan, Pricing Collateralized Swaps 8-
9 (May 2003) (working paper). 
82 Id. 
 Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code 29 
distress; second, the Code encourages rent-seeking behavior by 
would-be creditors, who have strong incentives to structure loan 
agreements as derivatives contracts. Interestingly, both effects are po-
tentially costly and therefore cut against an efficiency-based argu-
ment in favor of treating derivatives differently. 
A. The Code and Liquidity in OTC Markets 
The Code undoubtedly reduces the transactions costs of hedging 
risk. A counterparty is more willing to enter a derivatives contract 
with a firm (or will enter at a lower price) if it can minimize the costs 
it may incur if the firm suffers financial distress. The Code reduces 
these costs by protecting counterparties against “cherrypicking” and 
by increasing the speed with which a counterparty can seize collat-
eral. A debtor generally is free to choose which contracts to perform 
(accept) and which to breach (reject). If the debtor chooses to breach 
a contract, the non-breaching counterparty receives a low-priority un-
secured claim that will typically be paid a few cents on the dollar. 
This rule creates strong incentives for debtors to engage in “cherry 
picking”: to reject all losing contracts (and pay a few cents in dam-
ages) and accept all winning contracts (and enjoy the full benefits).  
Suppose, for example, that a firm has entered two supply agree-
ments with a contractual partner. When the firm files a bankruptcy 
petition, one contract is profitable (to the firm) and one is unprofit-
able, and the cost of the unprofitable contract exceeds the benefits of 
the profitable one. The firm, in other words, has a net obligation ow-
ing to the contractual partner. But netting is generally not allowed 
under the Bankruptcy Code.83 Instead, the firm is free to treat the con-
tracts independently and breach the losing contract, pay pennies in 
damages, and continue the winning contract. The result is that the 
debtor enjoys a net gain, not a net loss, from the two contracts. Every 
contractual partner of a distressed firm faces the prospect of cher-
rypicking—everyone, that is, except derivatives counterparties. These 
counterparties, consequently, anticipate lower costs in the event that 
the debtor enters bankruptcy. 
Counterparties anticipate lower costs for another reason as well: 
if the debtor firm enters bankruptcy, counterparties can immediately 
seize the cash, securities, and other collateral posted by the debtor. 
This is a benefit not enjoyed by any other creditor, which must typi-
                                                                                                                 
83 Netting is possible in limited cases subject to the judge-made doctrine of “re-
coupment,” which permits a creditor to net two contracts if they arise from the 
same transaction or occurrence. See generally COLLIERS ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.10 
(15th ed. 2004). 
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cally wait weeks, months, or years before a court grants it permission 
to seize collateral (and if the firm reorganizes, the creditor may never 
obtain the collateral). 
Together, these cost-reducing features of the Bankruptcy Code 
give derivatives counterparties strong incentives to enter contracts 
with firms even if those firms have a high likelihood of insolvency. 
Indeed, many economists suggest that the principal benefit of the 
Code’s special treatment of derivatives is that it contributes signifi-
cantly to the availability of over-the-counter derivatives and therefore 
has lowered the cost of hedging risk.84 A casual glance at the data, 
plotted for interest-rate and currency swaps, suggests this might be 
true. The 1990s saw a significant increase in the notional value of 
swaps transactions in particular and OTC derivatives contracts gener-
ally. In June 2000 OTC derivatives accounted for more than 90 per-
cent of the $108 trillion in derivatives notional principal accounted 
for by both exchange-traded and OTC derivatives. Only a decade ago 
exchange-traded and OTC derivatives markets were roughly equal in 
size. In 1998, the average daily turnover in OTC markets was esti-
mated to be about $2.7 trillion (about $675 trillion on an annualized 
                                                                                                                 
84 See, e.g., William J. Bergman, Robert R. Bliss, Christian A. Johnson, and 
George G. Kaufman, Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Im-
plications 24-25 (August 2003) (working paper). 
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basis). By comparison, in 1999 world GDP was about $31 trillion, 
and global net capital flows totaled $394 billion.85 Increased liquidity 
in OTC markets and firms’ greater access to derivatives contracts en-
ables firms to better hedge risk. 
Increased liquidity does not come free, however. The Code re-
duces the transaction costs of hedging risk by placing derivatives 
counterparties ahead of other creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. 
Counterparties are free to cancel executory contracts and seize collat-
eral while other contractual partners are vulnerable to cherry-picking 
and other secured creditors must bear some of the costs of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings (including delay in accessing collateral). The 
Code, then, redistributes wealth from ordinary creditors to derivatives 
counterparties. Ordinary creditors can respond by increasing the price 
of credit, which may limit the investment opportunities of some 
firms, or by seeking to limit (via contract) a borrower’s access to 
OTC markets. But these efforts generate transaction costs, which are 
presumably non-trivial (otherwise the Code’s effect on the transac-
tion costs of hedging is implausible).  
We therefore question the net social benefit of increasing liquid-
ity in OTC markets via redistributive provisions in the Bankruptcy 
Code. Enhanced liquidity is undoubtedly a social good, especially 
when it is the product of technological innovation (such as the 
growth of organized exchanges). It is less obviously a social good 
when it is the product of a government subsidy, paid for by other 
creditors.86 
                                                                                                                 
85 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 203, MODERN 
BANKING AND OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS 9 (2000). 
86 It may be worth mentioning another potential downside to the Code’s cost-
reducing provisions. As derivatives counterparties bear less of the costs of a firm 
insolvency, they have fewer incentives to monitor the firm’s financial condition. 
This effect is important, however, only if the reduction in monitoring incentives is 
significant, if monitoring by other creditors and by shareholders is inadequate, and 
if derivatives counterparties would continue to deal with the firm even if Congress 
eliminated the Bankruptcy Code special treatment of derivatives. We strongly 
doubt that these conditions are satisfied in the vast majority of cases. Bergman, 
Bliss, Johnson, and Kaufman, supra note 84, make a similar argument. 
In particular, notwithstanding the Code’s special treatment of derivatives con-
tracts, counterparties still have strong incentives to monitor the firm’s financial 
condition. Most derivatives contracts are marked-to-market and require the firm to 
post additional collateral as its estimated liability under the contract increases. Con-
sider, again, an interest-rate swap: the firm agrees to pay the counterparty, say, 5% 
per annum for two years on a notional principal (perhaps $10 million); in return, 
the counterparty agrees to pay the firm the six-month LIBOR rate on the same 
principal. As the LIBOR rate dips below 5%, the firm is a net debtor under the con-
tract. Most interest rate swaps will require the firm to post collateral to support its 
net indebtedness, and the farther LIBOR dips below 5%, the more collateral must 
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B. Effects on Rent Seeking 
In Section 3 we presented an argument in favor of exempting de-
rivatives contracts from the automatic stay, but we assumed that the 
identities of creditors and counterparties were fixed. If, instead, a 
would-be creditor could switch to being a derivatives counterparty 
prior to a counterparty’s insolvency, there could be significant distri-
butional effects. For example, an existing creditor might take steps to 
convert its debt contract into a derivatives contract, or a bank might 
enter a derivatives contract instead of lending directly to a firm. 
There are, in fact, many ways to offer financing through a de-
rivatives contract rather than an ordinary debt contract. One is to use 
total return swaps. Debtor, for example, wants to borrow $1 million 
from Bank in order to purchase bonds. If Debtor borrowed directly 
from Bank, it would pay interest equal to LIBOR plus, say, 2.5% per 
annum. The spread above LIBOR compensates Bank for the risk of 
default and the costs of bankruptcy. This type of loan agreement, 
however, would subject Bank to the automatic stay if Debtor entered 
bankruptcy. To avoid the stay, Bank proposes the following transac-
tion: Bank will purchase $1 million worth of the bonds and pay the 
total return (coupons, appreciation, etc.) on the bonds to Debtor for T 
periods. In return, Debtor will pay Bank LIBOR plus 1.5% per an-
num on a $1 million notional amount. At the end of the life of the 
contract (in period T), the value of the bonds will either exceed or fall 
below $1 million. If it exceeds $1 million, Bank pays Debtor the dif-
ference; if it falls below that amount, Debtor pays Bank the differ-
ence. Finally, and most importantly, throughout the life of the con-
tract, Debtor (the more risky party) must post collateral equal to its 
expected obligation at date T. Although functionally equivalent to an 
ordinary debt contract, this transaction creates a derivatives contract 
subject to the Code’s special provisions. If Debtor seeks bankruptcy 
protection, Bank is free to terminate the contract and seize collateral 
the Debtor posted. 
                                                                                                                 
be posted. Although the contract is fully collateralized at any point in time and al-
though the Code permits the counterparty to seize this collateral upon the firm’s in-
solvency, the counterparty continues to have incentives to monitor the firm’s finan-
cial condition. The possibility remains that LIBOR will dip further below 5%, but 
the firm will be unable to post the requisite collateral. Neither collateralization nor 
the Code therefore eliminates monitoring incentives. While it may be true that if 
counterparty costs increased, perhaps by eliminating the Code’s special treatment 
of derivatives, some counterparties will be less interested in dealing with and there-
fore in monitoring firms. We suspect that the Code’s net effect on creditor monitor-
ing, while probably existing, is likely to be trivial in magnitude. 
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More exotic contracts are possible.87 Again, suppose that Debtor 
wants to borrow $1 million from Bank. Suppose also that Debtor’s 
affiliate, Affiliate, is willing to guarantee the indebtedness. The guar-
antee, however, is little use to the Bank if Affiliate and Debtor are 
likely to enter bankruptcy at the same time. To take advantage of the 
Code’s special treatment of derivatives contracts, Bank proposes the 
following contract: Bank loans $1 million to Debtor in exchange for 
an unsecured note. Bank simultaneously enters a credit default option 
with Affiliate, a company related to Debtor. This option allows Bank 
to put the note to Affiliate in the event Debtor defaults. The option 
contract requires Affiliate to post margin equal to its expected obliga-
tion (which varies with Debtor’s financial condition). Thus, if Debtor 
and Affiliate enter bankruptcy, Bank enjoys the Code’s special treat-
ment of derivative contracts and can seize margin posted by Affiliate. 
These types of contracts, which substitute derivatives contracts 
for debt contracts, are relatively costly to write and are vulnerable to 
the risk that a court will look beyond their formal trappings and re-
characterize them as ordinary debt contracts. On the other hand, the 
gain from writing these contracts increases as a potential borrower’s 
financial condition worsens. Thus, if the Bankruptcy Code creates 
significant incentives for lenders to structure debt contracts as deriva-
tives contracts, these incentives should be strongest when the bor-
rower is financially distressed. Empirically, this suggests that we 
should see a firm’s involvement in derivatives contracts (as measured 
by the notional value of such contracts) increase in the months or 
years before it enters bankruptcy. 
In the absence of comprehensive data on this issue, we can point 
to anecdotal evidence that the Bankruptcy Code does encourage 
creditors to exploit the special provisions for derivatives contracts, at 
least in extreme cases. The case of Enron is again instructive. During 
the months before filing its Chapter 11 petition, the firm entered a 
wide range of derivatives contracts that appear to have disguised 
some loans as derivatives contracts,88 structured other loans as sales 
                                                                                                                 
87 We thank Hal Novikoff for this example. 
88 Enron is currently attempting to recharacterize these contracts as loans and 
thereby prevent counterparties from benefiting from the Code’s special treatment of 
derivatives. See Enron Corp. v. Citigroup Inc., et al., No. 03-09266 (SDNY Bankr. 
Sep. 24, 2003). See also defendant Deutsche Bank’s partial motion to dismiss, as-
serting its right to take advantage of exceptions to the automatic stay for derivatives 
contracts, in Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants the Deutsche Bank 
Entities’ Partial Motion to Dismiss, Enron Corp. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 03-09266 
(SDNY Bankr. Feb. 17, 2003). 
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combined with derivatives contracts,89 and gambled on the firm’s 
stock price.90 Most of these contracts are now the subject of litigation, 
with Enron attempting to recover collateral seized by the counterpar-
ties to these contracts.  
We are not the first to notice that the Code encourages creditors 
to use derivatives contracts to reduce the costs of bankruptcy. Indeed, 
a recent textbook91 encourages creditors to enter debt contracts and 
interest rate swaps simultaneously in order to circumvent some of the 
Code’s restrictions on debt contracts.92 We are, however, among the 
first to show the strength of the Code incentives to engage in such 
rent-seeking behaviour: the Code does not merely encourage credi-
tors to enter debt and derivatives contracts simultaneously; it encour-
ages creditors to avoid debt contracts entirely.  
This type of rent-seeking behavior shifts wealth from general 
creditors to derivatives counterparties ex post. If Affiliate and Debtor 
file bankruptcy petitions, Bank is better off than if it entered an ordi-
nary loan agreement with Debtor. Other creditors are worse off. 
Some creditors may be able to protect themselves ex ante, by charg-
ing higher interest rates as compensation for the losses resulting from 
rent-seeking. Other creditors may be unable to protect themselves, 
including accident victims (non-consensual creditors). In addition, 
the Code may unintentionally alter the debt structure of firms towards 
a greater reliance on derivatives by favoring derivatives counterpar-
ties over other creditors. The implications of such shift for firms and 
debt markets are unclear. 
                                                                                                                 
89 This transaction is at issue in Enron Corp. v. Citigroup Inc., et al., No. 03-
09266 (SDNY Bankr. Sep. 24, 2003) and Enron Corp. v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 
03-93597 (SDNY Bankr. Dec. 1, 2003). 
90 This was one function of the equity swaps and equity forwards at issue in En-
ron Corp. v. Lehman Brothers Finance, S.A., No. 03-93383 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 2003) 
(complaint filed Nov. 21, 2003). 
91 LYNN M. LOPUCKI AND CHRISTOPHER R. MIRICK, STRATEGIES FOR CREDI-
TORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS (Aspen 4th ed. 2003). 
92 Although the Code prevents a creditor from collecting “unmatured interest” 
due under a debt contract (i.e., interest payments expected in the future), § 
502(b)(2), the creditor can take steps to circumvent this rule by executing an inter-
est rate swap agreement that imposes a termination fee (equal to the unmatured in-
terest) on the defaulting party. For a case acknowledging this strategy but arguing 
that the strategy may not be profitable in practice and that, in any event, “the specu-
lative possibility that a lender could use interest rate swaps to evade [the Code’s 
limits on unmatured interest] does not overcome the strong Congressional policy of 
encouraging the innovative use of interest rate swaps,” see Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank 
of America National Trust and Savings Assoc., 322 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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CONCLUSION 
Our analysis suggests that the Code’s special treatment of de-
rivatives contracts cannot be justified by a fear of systemic risk in de-
rivatives markets. Indeed, exempting derivatives counterparties from 
the automatic stay may make matters worse by increasing systemic 
risk. But this conclusion does not necessarily imply that it is a mis-
take to afford derivatives special treatment under the Code. We pro-
pose an efficiency-based rationale for treating them differently that 
has nothing to do with fear of systemic risk: that derivatives contracts 
merit special treatment because they, like cash, are not firm-specific 
assets. A firm’s going-concern value does not depend on retention of 
pre-petition contracts or cash. To be sure, a firm cannot survive with-
out cash, and may be less likely to survive without derivatives con-
tracts. But a firm can replace pre-petition cash with post-petition 
loans, and can replace pre-petition derivatives contracts with post-
petition contracts. Although it may be costly to replace a customized 
machine, little cost is incurred in replacing cash and derivatives con-
tracts. Thus, there is no efficiency-based reason for the Bankruptcy 
Code to interfere with the non-bankruptcy-law entitlements of deriva-
tives counterparties and creditors with security interests in cash col-
lateral. They should be free to seize their collateral.  
But the case for reordering priorities in bankruptcy to favor de-
rivatives counterparties on grounds of economic efficiency is an un-
easy one for two reasons. First, it undermines the current treatment of 
cash collateral under the Code (which is subject to the automatic 
stay). Second, it does not take account of possible ex ante effects of 
giving special treatment to derivatives contracts. In particular, there 
will be redistribution costs because ordinary creditors will take steps 
to prevent (or at least receive compensation for) the costs associated 
with the substitution of derivatives contracts for debt contracts when 
debtors are threatened with financial distress. These costs must be 
weighed against the potential benefits of giving special treatment to 
derivatives contracts.  
Our analysis, however, should worry members of Congress and 
legislators in other countries, who have been lobbied heavily by spe-
cial interest groups (such as ISDA) to expand the special treatment of 
derivatives on grounds that such legislation is necessary to prevent a 
systemic meltdown in OTC derivatives markets should a derivatives 
counterparty suffer financial distress. 
